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Greater-or-Nothing 
Constitutional Rules 
John Fee† 
Abstract 
 Greater-or-nothing rules exist throughout constitutional law and 
constitute a growing trend. These rules give the government a choice: 
do nothing or take the desired action plus do something more. Yet 
often this “something more” is potentially more damaging to the 
constitutional value at stake. For example, the government can 
circumvent limitations imposed by the Free Speech Clause by 
regulating speech more broadly than originally intended. This Article 
unpacks this paradox and discusses justifications for greater-or-
nothing rules, particularly in an increasingly complex society. 
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Introduction 
Many constitutional rules force government actors to make a 
choice: either do something comprehensive or do nothing at all. What 
these rule prohibit is acting partway. Put another way, many rules 
hold that a greater governmental power does not always come with its 
lesser independent components. The power to do A plus B does not 
necessarily include the power to do A alone. 
Greater-or-nothing rules exist in almost all major areas of 
constitutional law, and they often seem paradoxical. They include 
antidiscrimination rules, rules prohibiting unconstitutional conditions, 
procedural rules, rules that hinge on government-defined entitlements 
or background laws, and more. While some arise from the text of the 
Constitution, many greater-or-nothing rules are judicial creations. 
Remarkably, over the last several decades, judges seem to have 
become increasingly fond of creating and applying new greater-or-
nothing rules. Whereas an older style of constitutional law depended 
more on direct judicial balancing of the costs and benefits of 
particular government decisions and setting corresponding boundaries 
on government behavior, courts today are more likely to insert 
themselves into the decisions of other branches by taking away partial 
options while leaving the ultimate decisions to the other branches. 
This Article attempts to explain why that might be.  
This Article also seeks to unravel the paradox seemingly attached 
to many greater-or-nothing rules: that the government can get around 
these rules by doing something more—something possibly more 
damaging to the constitutional value at stake—but not by doing less. 
For example, sometimes the government can get around the 
limitations of the Free Speech Clause by restricting more speech1 or 
by eliminating other public rights.2 Sometimes the government can 
get around the regulatory takings doctrine by imposing greater 
regulations on property.3 And sometimes the government can get past 
the Fourth Amendment’s restriction on unreasonable searches by 
searching more people in the same intrusive manner that is prohibited 
 
1. Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 50–51 (1994) (regulating the display of 
signs can be unconstitutional if it “restricts too little speech because its 
exemptions discriminate on the basis of the signs’ messages”). 
2. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123–24 (2003) (finding an anti-
trespass ordinance constitutional because it applied to more than just 
First Amendment speakers and it did not prohibit a “‘substantial’ 
amount of protected speech”). 
3. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987) (allowing 
an owner to build under conditions is unconstitutional, although the 
government retains the power to deny development altogether). 
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with one individual.4 This paradox calls for an explanation, one that 
is often lacking in cases or commentary. 
Although greater-or-nothing constitutional rules vary widely in 
their spheres of operation and their specific mechanics, I propose that 
there is value to addressing this large category of rules as a package. 
These rules share a similar structure and similar advantages, and they 
are vulnerable to a common kind of criticism. For these reasons, it 
should be possible to make some common claims about them, even if 
this analysis provides only a starting place for more particular 
application. Having a common analytical framework for these rules 
should make it easier to take the lessons that judges and scholars 
have learned from some of these rules and apply them to other 
doctrinal areas. Current scholarship provides no such framework.  
I argue that greater-or-nothing constitutional rules make sense as 
structural decision-making rules that depend on the comparative 
advantages of the institutions involved. As applied by courts to 
legislative and executive branches of government, greater-or-nothing 
rules can be rational tools for maximizing public welfare. But these 
rules do not appear rational if we pretend that any part of the 
government can independently know the ultimate decisions that 
governments should make to maximize public welfare. Greater-or-
nothing rules make particular sense as judicial tools for scrutinizing 
other branches, which the judiciary neither fully understands nor fully 
trusts, and as an alternative to either simple deference or simple 
substitution of judicial judgment. When working properly, these rules 
use the comparative advantages of politically insulated courts and of 
politically accountable branches of government together to achieve a 
set of results better than either could achieve alone.5 
Because greater-or-nothing rules are founded on judicial 
uncertainty as to specific policy outcomes, it makes sense that they 
would proliferate in a society that is becoming increasingly complex 
and that depends on greater specialization. They are often more 
appropriate for a pluralist society that is skeptical of universal truth, 
and that recognizes both the legitimacy and enormous range of 
preferences on such topics as speech, religion, family, and the good 
life. To borrow a phrase from Richard Epstein, they are “simple rules 
 
4. Compare Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) 
(holding that a “roving patrol” unconstitutionally searched car without 
a warrant) with United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) 
(holding that a security checkpoint that stopped every car could exercise 
judgment in selecting the cars to be searched without warrant). 
5. This is loosely consistent with John Hart Ely’s seminal work, 
Democracy and Distrust (1980), which describes constitutional law as a 
judicial tool to enhance democratic processes of government rather than 
standing in opposition to them. 
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for a complex world”6—rules that are designed to manage the 
incentives of competing actors, in this case government actors, in a 
society that has far too many components for effective judicial micro-
management. They are also decentralized rules, which have many 
advantages over centralized ones,7 and seem particularly appropriate 
as applied to courts, the least politically accountable branch of 
government. This justification has roots in public-choice theory8 and 
depends on certain assumptions about different kinds of government 
actors and government decisions. Identifying these assumptions 
suggests not only an answer to why such rules exist and are growing 
more common but also to why they are not always best. 
Parts I and II of this Article will discuss the defining features of 
greater-or-nothing rules and their proliferation in many areas of 
constitutional law. Part III will explore various justifications for these 
rules based on the institutions involved. Part IV will discuss how 
these rules are well suited to the growing complexity of government 
and society.  
I. WHAT IS A GREATER-OR-NOTHING RULE?  
A. Definition 
Greater-or-nothing constitutional rules follow a simple form. They 
provide that the government may perform some action (Action A), 
but only if it performs something additional (Action B). A rule of this 
type allows the government a greater, more active option (the power 
to do A plus B) as well as the option to do nothing, but does not 
allow the government some lesser subset of the greater power (the 
power to do A alone). 
Let us call A the restricted action and B the enabling action. 
Depending on the rule, the relationship between A and B could be 
reciprocal, such that the government is also barred from doing B 
unless it does A, but this is not an essential feature of greater-or-
nothing rules. The enabling action could be something small, such as 
when the Due Process Clause requires the government to give a 
hearing when depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.9 Or it 
could encompass a large set of activity, such as when the Equal 
Protection Clause requires the government to regulate all similarly 
situated people in order to regulate one person.10 In either case, the  
6. Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 21 (1995).  
7. See Todd J. Zywicki, Epstein and Polanyi on Simple Rules, Complex 
Systems, and Decentralization, 9 CONST. POL. ECON. 143 (1998). 
8. Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, The Reason of 
Rules: Constitutional Political Economy, at X–XI (1985). 
9.  U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
10.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  
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government can do something particular only if it is willing to include 
the act as part of something larger, sometimes massively larger. 
Greater-or-nothing rules are an alternative to simply allowing or 
prohibiting the particular action under review. And they seem, at 
least in form, indifferent as to whether the government should take a 
more active or a more passive option. 
While some greater-or-nothing rules are explicit, many arise from 
the structure and preconditions of the doctrines that courts apply. 
For this reason, greater-or-nothing options might exist ex ante where 
they do not exist ex post, it being too late for the government to take 
the more active option in the case under review. And yet, for purposes 
of examining the rationality of rules as regulators of government 
behavior, the ex ante effects of rules are often most significant.  
Consider, for example, the public forum doctrine. Suppose the 
government fines Mary for distributing literature on a public sidewalk 
in violation of city regulations. She may defend her case on the 
grounds that she was acting in a traditional public forum (a city 
sidewalk), and that she accordingly has a right to distribute literature 
in that place. In the given case, ex post, it will be too late for the 
government to change the features of the location to something other 
than a traditional public forum, so there is not a greater option 
affecting the judgment against Mary. But if the deciding court defines 
a traditional public forum according to criteria that the government 
has authority to change in the future, the court may effectively offer 
the government a greater-or-nothing option ex ante. The legal 
framework provides that the government must either allow the broad 
range of public rights that go along with a traditional public forum or 
eliminate enough public rights by qualifying the space as something 
else.11 For example, under current law, the government might 
eliminate a public forum by divesting itself of ownership or changing 
the use of its property. In this sense, the traditional public forum 
doctrine operates as a greater-or-nothing rule. 
The alternative to greater-or-nothing rules are those that establish 
fixed areas of impermissible government action. Let us call these 
boundary rules. Like greater-or-nothing rules, constitutional 
boundaries may exist in the form of bright-line rules or case-by-case 
tests and standards. Either way, what makes a constitutional 
principle operate as a boundary is that (a) the rule restrains the 
government from taking some ultimate action and (b) the government 
 
11. Compare First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1129 n. 11 (10th Cir. 2002) (creation of a 
privately owned pedestrian plaza does not eliminate a public forum 
while a public easement remains), with Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1256–57 (10th Cir. 2005) (subsequently 
vacating the public easement on the same, private plaza caused it to 
lose its public forum status).  
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cannot avoid the restraint by taking additional action. Unlike the 
greater-or-nothing rules, the prerequisites and elements of a boundary 
rule’s constitutional principle are beyond the regulated government’s 
power to turn on or off on its own. For example, the Supreme Court 
imposed a boundary rule in Roe v. Wade12 by holding that a pregnant 
woman has a right to abortion during the first trimester of her 
pregnancy.13 The Court also established a boundary in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey14 by holding that 
the government may not unduly burden a woman’s right to an 
abortion through regulation.15 The latter is more of a standard than a 
bright-line rule, but still functions as a boundary by declaring some 
type of government actions entirely out of bounds.  
B. Paradoxical and Nonparadoxical Rules  
Some greater-or-nothing rules seem paradoxical, whereas others 
do not. A greater-or-nothing rule is not paradoxical if the enabling 
action would directly mitigate the negative consequences of the 
restricted action. For example, the Takings Clause provides that the 
government can take a citizen’s property only if it provides just 
compensation.16 This is a greater-or-nothing rule because it makes one 
kind of government action (taking property) conditional on the 
performance of an additional action (compensation). The rule makes 
sense on its face, however, because the enabling action directly 
addresses a harm that the restricted action would cause to the 
individual. In this case, the combination of two actions would cause 
less harm to constitutional interests than one of those actions alone 
would cause.17  
By contrast, a greater-or-nothing rule is paradoxical if the 
enabling action does not seem to mitigate the constitutional harm of 
the restricted action. If the enabling action requires a cost to the 
government actor that does not help the individual affected by the 
restricted action, the rule may seem flawed. Why should the 
 
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
13.  Id. at 163. 
14. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
15.  Id. at 895, 901. 
16.  U.S. Const. amend. V.  
17. This assumes that the Takings Clause is designed to protect an 
individual’s economic status relative to the government. For an 
argument that the Takings Clause functions more completely as an 
equality rule between citizens, see John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a 
Comparative Right, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1003 (2003). Under the latter 
perspective, the Takings Clause remains arguably paradoxical, insofar as 
the government may still tax property owners and use the revenue to 
take away their property. 
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government get away with causing a particular kind of constitutional 
harm just because it is willing to do something extra that is either 
unrelated or adds to the harm? This is the common paradox of 
greater-or-nothing rules. If the judiciary (or constitutional drafter) has 
enough information to determine that Action A is harmful enough to 
prohibit (whether categorically or on a case-by-case basis), then a 
decision establishing boundaries seems most sensible. Alternatively, if 
the action has enough potential merit such that it should be within 
the government’s power, then to defer makes the most sense. But 
either way, it seems puzzling to allow the action only when coupled 
with extra action that does not reduce its harm.  
Of course, whether a greater-or-nothing rule is paradoxical 
depends on one’s perception of the constitutional value at stake. For 
this reason, reasonable people might disagree as to whether a 
particular rule is paradoxical. Consider, for example, the Supreme 
Court’s management of the free exercise of religion. If the Free 
Exercise Clause is designed to protect individual freedom to practice 
religion,18 then the rule set forth in Employment Division v. Smith19 
seems on the surface to be quite puzzling. Smith holds that a 
government may restrict a person’s religious conduct, even conduct 
that is central to that person’s religions practice, so long as it does so 
through laws that are generally applicable and facially neutral.20 So 
the government can avoid the restraints of Smith as applied to 
religious adherents by making its regulations sufficiently broad and 
religiously neutral. How does this serve either religious freedom or 
general liberty if the rule encourages the government to make its 
regulations affect more people?21 To the person who is denied the 
ability to practice her religion, it hardly seems like compensation to 
know that other people are similarly restricted. And to those others 
whom the law encourages the government to regulate (beyond the 
religious worshiper), the rule causes an additional loss of freedom. If 
fewer regulations affecting religion is the purpose of the rule, a court 
would more directly achieve this by interpreting the First 
Amendment to exempt religious conduct from even general regulation, 
at least when the governmental interest is weak.  
 
18.  U.S. Const. amend. I. 
19. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
20. 494 U.S. at 878–82. 
21. See generally Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: 
The General Applicability Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 
26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627 (2003) (examining the general 
applicability requirement in both theory and practice and concluding 
that the requirement distributes constitutional exemptions in an 
unprincipled and random manner).  
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But if the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to promote 
religious neutrality, rather than to promote individual religious 
autonomy, the rule stated in Smith makes more sense. The rule 
directly achieves this value whether the government responds to the 
rule with more or less regulation. Recognizing greater-or-nothing rules 
and their potential paradoxes may sometimes help in the simple way 
of causing us to identify the constitutional purposes of such rules 
more accurately.  
Restating the constitutional purpose of a rule, however, does not 
always persuasively resolve the paradox. For example, for the rule of 
Smith, many would say that religious neutrality alone is not the same 
as individual free exercise of religion and, further, that neutrality 
ought to be a means of achieving religious freedom rather than an end 
in itself.22 At a broader level, we should recognize that one can always 
claim that a rule is rational because it accomplishes precisely what it 
is structured to accomplish, but this circular reasoning is only 
persuasive if one is unwilling to dig deeper. It is particularly tempting 
to justify greater-or-nothing rules with large comparative ideals such 
as equality, neutrality, and fairness. These are such regular terms of 
constitutional law that they have become axioms that substitute for 
deeper analysis. Those who are satisfied with stopping at such terms 
are likely to see few paradoxical constitutional rules.  
For those who prefer to treat fairness, equality, and neutrality as 
means of maximizing public welfare in more concrete substantive 
terms rather than as stand-alone axioms,23 there are many 
constitutional rules that need further explanation to avoid the 
greater-or-nothing paradox, including even equal protection rules. 
Americans have a strong affection for fairness and equal treatment,24 
often backed by an intuitive sense that equal protection rules and 
other antidiscrimination rules of constitutional law lead to improved 
public welfare, but it would be useful to unpack this intuition and 
figure out if and why this works as a substantive matter. Analyzing 
equal protection rules alongside other accepted yet paradoxical 
greater-or-nothing rules can help provide an answer. 
 
22. E.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith 
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1129–52 (1990) (critiquing the Smith 
standard as a measure of religious freedom).  
23. Notable critics of using equality and fairness as legal axioms include 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare 
(2002) and Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. 
Rev. 537 (1982).  
24. See Ward Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1992 (2002) (reviewing Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 23) (examining 
ways that fairness as a preference is relevant to policymaking). 
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II. The Trend Toward Greater-or-Nothing Rules 
While some greater-or-nothing rules have existed since the 
Constitution’s ratification, the Supreme Court has become especially 
fond of making new ones in recent decades. Among the new greater-
or-nothing rules are antidiscrimination rules, rules against 
unconstitutional conditions, rules based on government-controlled 
background conditions, procedural rules, and more. They seem to 
have proliferated in almost every area of constitutional law, including 
those that are based on constitutional clauses that appear on their 
face to offer no greater-power options. The new preference for greater-
or-nothing rules seems to transcend liberal-conservative ideologies on 
the Court: they were featured prominently in the Warren Court and 
have continued to expand in the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts 
Courts. And among the Justices who seem to prefer greater-or-
nothing rules the most are those as opposite as Justices Scalia and 
Brennan. 
Part of the proliferation of greater-or-nothing rules may be due to 
the simple growth of constitutional law; there are many more cases 
and sub-categories of constitutional law than there used to be. 
However, it also appears that the Supreme Court’s style of 
jurisprudence has significantly changed. Whereas the Supreme Court 
used to be strongly inclined to impose simple boundaries for 
government behavior based on either a balancing of interests or more 
formal methods, it now seems to prefer a more conditional approach, 
identifying a part of the analysis that is for the court to decide while 
leaving government regulators a range of options. The result has been 
a massive growth of greater-or-nothing rules.  
A. Antidiscrimination Rules 
The most obvious example of greater-or-nothing rules are the 
many antidiscrimination rules of constitutional law. By 
antidiscrimination rules, I mean not only rules that prohibit 
discrimination between people but any rule that recognizes disfavored 
distinctions or underinclusiveness in the law. These rules encourage 
the government to treat certain classes of people, products, behavior, 
or situations equivalently or face heightened scrutiny for doing 
otherwise. Such rules can encourage the government to broaden its 
regulations to avoid constitutional restraint. 
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence exemplifies this kind of 
rule, although it is not the only source. What is remarkable about 
equal protection law is not that it imposes greater-or-nothing choices, 
which one should expect from the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but rather that the Court has made it so dominant in the field of 
constitutional law since the 1950s. This represents a judicial choice. A 
century ago, despite having the same Equal Protection Clause, the 
Supreme Court allowed many forms of discrimination that today are 
not allowed. Beginning in the 1950s, the Warren Court created a 
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revolution in equal protection law with Brown v. Board of Education25 
and other civil rights era decisions, giving new focus to questions of 
discrimination in constitutional law. Since then, equal protection law 
has continued to expand and increase its rigor. New areas of 
application include sex and gender,26 political representation by 
geography,27 sexual orientation,28 language,29 disability,30 and class-of-
one cases.31 We have moved a long way from Plessy v. Ferguson32 to 
Bush v. Gore.33 If one takes a step back, the breadth and 
pervasiveness of equal protection law today compared to an earlier era 
is astonishing and illustrates the kind of comparative jurisprudence 
that the Supreme Court has chosen to favor. This has made it more 
difficult than ever for the government to regulate one or a few people 
as compared to many. This development has come at roughly the 
same time as the Court has moved away from setting substantive 
boundary-type limits on the government’s power to regulate the 
economy, as it did during the era of Lochner v. New York.34  
Perhaps more remarkably, antidiscrimination has become 
dominant in Free Speech Clause and Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence, even though the First Amendment says nothing about 
equality, neutrality, or discrimination. Today, one of the most 
important threshold questions in a freedom of speech case is whether 
the government has regulated speech on the basis of content, or, in 
other words, whether the law differentiates between different 
categories of expression on the basis of content elements, such as 
words, viewpoint, subject matter, or communicative impact.35 This 
means that a regulation that applies to all speech regardless of 
content will usually avoid strict scrutiny and is likely to be 
constitutional,36 but if the same regulation makes content-based 
 
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
26. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
27. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
28. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
29. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 
641 (1966). 
30. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
31. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). 
32. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
33. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curium).  
34. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
35. See John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1103, 1122–
30 (2005). 
36. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (holding 
constitutional a content-neutral restriction on megaphones).  
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exceptions, it will rarely survive constitutional review.37 This 
framework means that a speech regulation will often fail 
constitutional muster because it does not regulate enough speech. 
This is so, even though the relevant clause of the First Amendment, 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,”38 
seems to work in only one direction, toward greater permissibility for 
speech. 
But content discrimination has not always been a focus in 
freedom of speech law.39 The Supreme Court’s freedom of speech cases 
prior to the 1960s do not mention content discrimination but rather 
depend on a kind of boundary analysis. In the earlier twentieth 
century, speech cases turned essentially on whether someone’s 
expression counted as “protected” speech and, if so, whether the 
government’s regulation was reasonable.40 This approach was a kind 
of balancing framework that factored the individual’s interest and the 
government’s interest, but it did not depend much on how the 
government treated similarly situated speakers or speech content.  
In fact, it was not until the 1970s that the Supreme Court began 
saying in clear terms that a law is presumed unconstitutional if it 
regulates on the basis of content.41 In Police Department of Chicago v. 
Mosley,42 the Court went so far as to describe this as the primary 
concern of the First Amendment. “[A]bove all else,” the Court said, 
“the First Amendment means that government has no power to 
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content.”43 Since Mosley, the Supreme Court has continued to 
extend the rule against speech discrimination with rigor,44 while 
seemingly relaxing its scrutiny of nondiscriminatory speech 
 
37. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 
(2000) (“It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its 
content will ever be permissible.”). 
38.  U.S. Const. amend. I.  
39. For a more thorough overview of the change of focus in speech 
jurisprudence, see Fee, supra note 35, at 1116–22. 
40. See id. at 1116–17 (describing the shift toward antidiscrimination in free 
speech law in the latter twentieth century). 
41. See e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (describing the 
“usual rule that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form or 
content of individual expression”). 
42. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
43. Id. at 95.  
44. E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (finding 
that content discrimination in the regulation of even unprotected action, 
such as vandalism or threats, makes a law unconstitutional). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 1·2013 
Greater-or-Nothing Constitutional Rules 
112 
regulations. In today’s free speech jurisprudence, balancing matters 
less while the presence or absence of discrimination matters more.45  
The Supreme Court’s changes to Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence were similar but more dramatic. Prior to 1989, free 
exercise of religion primarily functioned as a boundary between 
individuals and government; it asked whether a law substantially 
burdened a person’s religious exercise and, if so, whether it served a 
compelling governmental interest.46 But in Employment Division v. 
Smith,47 the Supreme Court surprised many observers by holding that 
individual and governmental interests do not matter as long as a law 
is sufficiently broad and religiously neutral.48 While thus reducing 
religious freedom in one sense, the Court followed Smith by increasing 
its scrutiny of underinclusive laws in Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.49 In Lukumi, the Court made clear that 
the threshold questions of neutrality and general applicability are 
rigorous ones that take into account both legislative history and 
underinclusivity.50  
Dormant Commerce Clause51 jurisprudence has moved in a similar 
direction since its origins: toward greater emphasis on discrimination 
and less on boundaries and balancing. The underlying principle of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause is that states may not impose regulations 
that substantially burden interstate commerce. Originally, this did 
 
45. Several First Amendment scholars claim that government neutrality, 
rather than individual substantive freedom, is the sole or dominant goal 
of the Free Speech Clause. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, 
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment 
Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413 (1996); Jed Rubenfeld, The First 
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 767 (2001). 
46. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
47. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Congress responded to Smith and “attempt[ed] to 
accord heightened statutory protection to religious exercise” by passing 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which was subsequently 
ruled unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments. 
Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1655–56 (2011) (citing City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)). Congress then passed the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. Id.  
48.  494 U.S. at 876–80 (“[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not 
the object of the [law] but merely an incidental effect of a generally 
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not 
been offended.”). 
49. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
50. Id. at 531–46. In Lukumi, the Court held unconstitutional a city 
ordinance prohibiting the unnecessary ritual slaughter of animals. 
Among the ordinance’s constitutional flaws was the fact that it 
exempted some secular purposes for slaughtering animals but did not 
exempt religious purposes. Id. at 542, 546. 
51.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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not seem to have much to do with discrimination against interstate 
commerce relative to intrastate commerce but rather, and more 
simply, whether a state regulation went too far and addressed matters 
more appropriate for federal regulation.52 Over time, however, and 
particularly since the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court has 
increasingly applied the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as a rule 
that prohibits discrimination against out-of-state interests. A 
regulation that exempts in-state businesses will rarely survive 
constitutional scrutiny,53 whereas a regulation that contains no such 
exemptions is likely to be constitutional.54 
Even the jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment’s Search and 
Seizure Clause55 shows the influence of modern antidiscrimination 
thinking. The text of the Fourth Amendment prohibits only 
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” which seems to have little to do 
with whether a law is underinclusive or discriminatory.56 And yet, 
beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court established two separate 
lines of search-and-seizure cases; one in which the government action 
involved an ad hoc search of one person and one in which the search 
was part of broad consistent scheme affecting many in the same way. 
When, for example, government officers establish a checkpoint at 
which all peoples or vehicles are stopped consistently, a lower 
standard of review applies, even though the search may be equally 
intrusive and affect more people.57 
B. Rules Regarding Government Property and 
Government-Controlled Background Criteria 
The trend toward antidiscrimination rules in modern 
constitutional law is unmistakable and alone deserves greater 
scholarly focus, but the Supreme Court’s modern preference for 
 
52. E.g., Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 
(1886); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 321 (1851). 
53. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) 
(“[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, 
a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.”). 
54. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970) (holding 
an Arizona law constitutional insofar as it (a) required produce grown 
and packaged within the state to be labeled with the state name and 
(b) “forbid the misleading use of its name on produce that was grown or 
packaged elsewhere”); see also James D. Fox, Note, State Benefits 
Under the Pike Balancing Test of the Dormant Commerce Clause: 
Putative or Actual?, 1 Ave Maria L. Rev. 175, 206–13 (2003) 
(proposing that the Pike balancing test should be considered as simply 
rational basis scrutiny).  
55. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
56. Id. 
57. See cases cited supra note 4. 
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greater-or-nothing rules extends further than this. The Supreme Court 
has also favored new greater-or-nothing rules that depend on how the 
government uses or controls its property or other background 
conditions that the government controls.  
The traditional public forum doctrine fits squarely within this 
trend at the Supreme Court. In the nineteenth century, when 
confronted with whether free speech rights exist on government 
property, the Supreme Court rejected a greater-or-nothing approach 
and instead saw the analysis simply as one of boundaries.58 The Court 
found that since the government possesses the greater power to 
control and dispose of public property, it must necessarily have the 
lesser power as a proprietor to prohibit speech there.59 A generation 
later, however, the Supreme Court overruled this line of thought when 
it held that government dedication of property as a street or sidewalk 
comes with constitutional obligations so long as the government 
continues to dedicate the property in a particular manner.60 The 
Supreme Court’s more recent cases have expanded this doctrine and 
considered what it takes to establish or eliminate a traditional public 
forum, thus making the greater-or-nothing aspect of the public forum 
doctrine more explicit and even deliberate.61 
The Supreme Court has also added greater-or-nothing rules by 
recognizing exceptions to constitutional rules based on government-
controlled criteria. For example, there exists an exception to the rule 
disfavoring content-based speech regulation in situations where the 
 
58. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897) (comparing the 
legislature’s conditional prohibition on public speaking to the right of an 
individual to forbid another individual to enter his house). 
59. Id. at 48 (positing that “the greater power contains the lesser”). 
60. E.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) (“[O]ne who is 
rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries 
with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views 
in an orderly fashion. . . . [including] by handbills and literature as well 
as by the spoken word.”); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 
496, 518 (1939) (Stone, J.) (holding void sections of an ordinance that 
prohibited individuals from distributing printed materials and holding 
public meetings in streets and other public places); Schneider v. Town 
of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (“So long as legislation . . . does 
not abridge the constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the street to 
impart information through speech or the distribution of literature, it 
may lawfully regulate the conduct of those using the streets.”). 
61. See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 
672, 678–80 (1992) (discussing the “forum based” approach to assessing 
restrictions of speech on government property); id. at 699–700 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the government may not remove 
a public forum’s designation and “by fiat assert broad control over 
speech”); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725–30 (1990) 
(plurality opinion) (discussing the characteristics of the Postal Service 
sidewalk at issue and ultimately concluding that it was a nonpublic forum).  
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government identifies the favored category of speech as its own.62 In 
other words, the government may sometimes intentionally skew a 
speech environment toward certain favored viewpoints if the 
government is willing to make clear that doing so is the very purpose 
of the program under review.63 Similarly, an exception to regulatory-
takings rules applies where background principles of state law allow 
the kind of government action in question.64 This gives state 
governments ex ante control over the scope of the regulatory takings 
doctrine applicable to them. And constitutional rules that prevent 
overregulation of commercial speech allow the government to prohibit 
advertising of illegal transactions—a category that can be created by 
state law.65 For example, if a state makes the sale of alcohol illegal, 
then it can also prohibit the advertising of alcohol sales. But its power 
to restrict advertising will be limited if it allows alcohol sales to 
remain legal.66 The greater power to prohibit sales and advertising 
does not include the lesser power to prohibit advertising alone. 
C. Rules Banning Unconstitutional Conditions 
Another large area of expanding greater-or-nothing rules are those 
against unconstitutional conditions. Unconstitutional-condition rules 
prohibit the government from offering regulatory exemptions or 
government benefits with coercive conditions attached. They are 
greater-or-nothing rules if the government retains the greater power 
to deny the benefit or regulatory privilege altogether while being 
constitutionally restrained from offering it conditionally as an 
incentive for something that the government could not compel 
directly.  
The Supreme Court has seemed to favor these kinds of rules in 
recent decades. For example, in Nollan v. California Coastal 
 
62. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) 
(holding that the placement of a privately donated monument in a 
public park is government speech, and, thus, not subject to the Free 
Speech Clause). 
63. For more on government speech, see Fee, supra note 35, at 1136–40 
(describing the government-supported viewpoints and public education 
exceptions to the First Amendment’s rule against content 
discrimination).  
64. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031–32 (1992) 
(remanding for determination of the background principles of South 
Carolina nuisance or property law that could impact whether the 
contested government prohibition is a taking). 
65. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980) (“The government may ban forms of 
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it or 
commercial speech related to illegal activity.” (citations omitted)).  
66. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996). 
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Commission,67 the Supreme Court held that the government violated 
the Takings Clause by conditioning land use permissions on the 
granting of unrelated property interests to the government.68 The 
government can often deny an owner’s proposed land use altogether, 
but it cannot offer a deal unless it meets certain criteria.69 Likewise, 
the government may refuse to offer a job to any person, but, since the 
mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court has limited the 
government’s ability to coerce private decisions through offers of 
employment.70 And most recently, the Supreme Court held that while 
the Federal Government may condition federal grants to states in 
many ways, there is a limit to the use of these coercive conditions 
where the States lack realistic choices.71 According to this principle, 
the Supreme Court struck down provisions of the Affordable Care Act 
that impose new Medicaid requirements on states.72  
Finally, the Supreme Court in recent decades has dramatically 
increased the procedural rigor by which governments must prove that 
a person deserves to be punished or to lose some entitlement, thus 
representing yet another expansion area for greater-or-nothing rules. 
For example, consider the constitutional criminal procedure revolution 
of the mid-twentieth century73 or the Supreme Court’s extension of 
 
67. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
68. Id. at 841–42.  
69. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (adding a “rough 
proportionality” requirement, and thus more rigor, to the Nollan rule). 
70. E.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626–29 (1978) (holding 
unconstitutional a state rule prohibiting ministers from serving as 
legislators); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265–68 (1967) 
(holding unconstitutional a law that broadly prohibited any member of 
the Communist party from employment in a defense facility); Elfbrandt 
v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 16–19 (1966) (holding unconstitutional an 
overbroad law that required all state employees to take an oath of 
loyalty and threatened discharge from public office any oath signatory 
who associated with a group seeking to overthrow the government). 
71. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) 
(holding that the federal government cannot withdraw a state’s existing 
Medicaid funds for failure to participate in the new program set forth in 
the Affordable Care Act). 
72. Id. 
73. See, e.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 137–39 (1979) (holding that 
trials for nonpetty defenses must be decided unanimously if tried by six-
member juries); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968) 
(holding that the Sixth Amendment applies to state criminal cases for 
nonpetty offenses); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (“[T]he 
government seeking to punish an individual [must] produce the evidence 
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, 
simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth[, including during 
a custodial interrogation].”); see also Corinna Barrett Lain, 
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due process to new classes of property in the 1970s, including 
government jobs74 and regulatory entitlements.75 These rules involving 
unconstitutional conditions are greater-or-nothing rules because they 
leave open to the government various ex ante options to avoid 
procedures in the long run, such as eliminating elements of offenses 
that are difficult to prove and relying instead on prosecutorial 
discretion, changing elements into sentencing factors,76 increasing the 
statutory punishment for offenses to pressure defendants into plea 
bargains, and legislating away regulatory entitlements. Like many 
other new greater-or-nothing rules, these particular rules have 
changed the dynamic of government decisions in important ways 
while declaring few outcomes to be categorically off limits.  
III. Why Greater-or-Nothing Rules? 
Why might the Supreme Court prefer greater-or-nothing rules in 
constitutional law? In this section, I will outline some reasons why 
greater-or-nothing rules can make sense under the right assumptions, 
producing outcomes for law that are preferable to either boundary 
rules or deference to other branches. A common theme of these 
justifications is the dependence on comparative advantages of 
politically insulated courts and other parts of government. As the gap 
between these comparative advantages increases with society’s 
growing complexity, it makes sense that courts would turn 
increasingly to greater-or-nothing rules.  
 
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role 
in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1361 (2004) 
(describing the Warren Court’s criminal procedure holdings in a 
historical legal context). 
74. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1972) 
(acknowledging that tenured public college professors, untenured college 
professors and staff members discharged during their contract terms, 
and teachers with “a clearly implied promise of continued employment” 
possess “interests in continued employment that are safeguarded by due 
process”). 
75. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that an individual’s 
receipt of welfare benefits constituted an interest that is protected by 
procedural due process); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 (1976) 
(noting that due process applies where the government seeks to 
terminate an individual’s Social Security disability benefits). 
76. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491–97 (2000) (rejecting a 
New Jersey law that allowed a defendant first to be convicted of a 
second-degree offense by a jury that found guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt and then to receive punishment equivalent to that of a first-
degree offense after a judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the defendant acted with the requisite “purpose”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 1·2013 
Greater-or-Nothing Constitutional Rules 
118 
A. Assumptions and Methodology  
For these purposes, let us assume a realist and consequentialist 
approach to constitutional law. That is to say, let us assume that all 
constitutional rules should be designed ultimately to produce social 
benefits that exceed social costs.77 Within this framework, any 
constitutional rule that prohibits the government from performing 
some category of action should be premised on the idea that 
(a) the costs of such actions are likely greater than their benefits 
and (b) the government actors whom the rule restricts cannot be fully 
trusted to avoid such harmful action on their own. In this context, 
the term constitutional rule does not include only bright-line rules and 
textual rules but also judicially managed standards, balancing tests 
and case-by-case holdings. While bright-line rules and case-by-case 
standards each have their respective advantages,78 the choice between 
them is itself a policy decision that does not affect the analysis of 
greater-or-nothing rules.  
Let us further assume for simplicity that there are two types of 
actors in a constitutional system: those that make and apply the 
constitutional rules and those that are controlled by them. The former 
includes the Constitution’s drafters as well as courts that make, 
interpret, and expound particular doctrines of constitutional law. 
Among those restricted by the rules are executive and legislative 
branches of government that are more responsive to the will of the 
people and, in some cases, have particular expertise.  
By treating judges as rule makers and focusing on the policy 
reasons for rules from their perspective, I do not intend to suggest 
that real-world judges are free-wheeling policymakers who are 
unconstrained by constitutional authority. We know that they are not 
and should not act as such. But for purposes of analyzing the 
rationality of rules applied by the judiciary to other branches of 
government, it is useful to set aside questions of judicial authority, 
textual interpretation, and activism. For these purposes, it does not 
matter to what extent particular rules come from constitutional 
conventions, constitutional text, previous judicial decisions, or the 
courts’ own policy judgments in particular cases. What matters 
instead is that the constitutional rules courts apply to other branches 
of government should reflect a sound policy judgment regarding the 
weaknesses of those restricted branches of government. And if the 
 
77. For a defense of cost-benefit analysis as an underlying First Amendment 
principle, see Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in 
First Amendment Analysis, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 737, 740 (2002). 
78. For contrasting views, see Antonin Scalia, Essay, The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989) and Cass R. Sunstein, 
Problems with Rules, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 953 (1995). 
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rules do not make sense, they should be changed, whether through 
judicial decision or constitutional amendment. 
Therefore, when the judiciary enforces constitutional rules against 
other branches of government, it should reflect some comparative 
advantage that courts have relative to other branches. Granted, for 
most decisions made by executive officers and legislators, we trust 
that their own policy judgment is superior to that of courts and that 
democracy is the best way to ensure that these actors make optimal 
decisions. But if this were always true, the judiciary would have no 
meaningful role in constitutional law. Judicially enforceable 
constitutional rules make sense where the judiciary has some 
comparative advantage over more politically responsive government 
actors.79 
With that framework in place, let us restate the problem of 
greater-or-nothing rules in terms of government institutions. Every 
enforceable constitutional rule should reflect a policy judgment of 
some kind, including a judgment that the restricted branches of 
government cannot be trusted to decide some ultimate policy 
questions on their own, at least not without judicial review. For 
judicial review to make sense, judges must have some kind of 
institutional advantage over political branches. But if we could count 
on judges to have a complete advantage on the question under review, 
then only boundaries are necessary. A judiciary that is wiser on all 
components of a decision would either prohibit the reviewable action 
or allow it. But it should not need to say to another branch: “The 
choice is yours; you may proceed with the suspect action only if you 
choose to combine it with some other action.”  
If we assume, however, that the judiciary has an advantage on 
only some components of a decision, while the other branch retains 
advantages on other components, then the advantage of greater-or-
nothing rules becomes apparent. Much as the rules of a market 
economy govern the incentives of private actors without making 
ultimate decisions for them in a top-down manner, greater-or-nothing 
rules of constitutional law are useful measures to correct the 
incentives of government actors without directing them to a 
predetermined result. 
 
79. This was the theme of the famous footnote 4 of United States v. Carlene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (declining to opine as to 
“whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a 
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and 
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”), 
as well as in John Hart Ely’s work in Democracy and Distrust. See 
generally Ely, supra note 5 (describing constitutional law as a judicial 
tool to enhance democratic processes of government rather than 
standing in opposition to them).  
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B. Mitigation Rules 
The easiest rules to justify by the concept of partial comparative 
advantage are mitigation rules. These rules effectively say to a 
government actor: “You may go forward only if you take precautions 
or otherwise clean up the harm.” These rules work where the rule 
maker lacks the information or capacity to say whether the 
government should ultimately take a particular course of action (such 
as convicting a particular suspect) but does have the capacity to 
appreciate the dangers of such actions and the appropriate ways to 
mitigate those dangers (such as through a full trial of the evidence). 
Judicially imposed mitigation rules make sense where the judiciary 
does not know as well as other branches when particular kinds of 
government actions are preferable, but does know better than other 
branches that (a) government actions of that type do cause material 
harm; (b) such harm can be prevented or diminished by additional 
government action; and (c) the prevention measures would impose 
fewer social costs than their social benefits in the long run. In these 
circumstances, a greater-or-nothing mitigation rule should lead to 
better outcomes than either simple boundaries or deference alone 
could achieve. 
C. Government Would Never Take the Greater Option 
In some cases, courts might predict that the enabling option is so 
costly to the government that it would never choose it. Such a rule, 
therefore, is designed to achieve a particular outcome and functions 
similarly to a boundary. For example, courts may have assumed in 
creating the traditional public forum doctrine that cities would not 
eliminate public parks and sidewalks to avoid public forum 
obligations. When this assumption is at work, then we could describe 
the rule as a false greater-or-nothing rule. While they purport to offer 
choices, the government is never supposed to choose the greater 
option, and any time that it does so the rule will have backfired. 
This explanation for greater-or-nothing rules is relatively weak for 
two reasons. First, if the purpose of a greater-or-nothing rule is to 
deter a particular government action in all circumstances, it would be 
simpler and more candid for courts to simply prohibit the action. 
Second, a prediction that the government would never take the more 
harmful greater option could often be mistaken. This error is 
especially likely if courts consider the options in all-or-nothing terms 
or too narrowly based on the case at hand, without considering the 
wide spectrum of ex ante choices that a rule sometimes leaves open 
and encourages. For example, while few cities have bulldozed public 
sidewalks to avoid First Amendment obligations, it could be that the 
public forum doctrine has discouraged cities from building public 
sidewalks in areas of new development, causing a loss of free speech 
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and other public advantages arising from having government-owned 
pedestrian areas.80  
D. Separating Exceptional Cases 
A related and better justification for greater-or-nothing rules 
could be to deter the government from compromising important 
constitutional values except in exceptional cases. This use of a 
greater-or-nothing rule supposes a distrust of politically accountable 
branches of government in usual cases, but it also supposes that the 
political branches are better able than courts at recognizing extreme 
situations that justify a change to the normal rules.  
Consider the clause of the Constitution that allows Congress to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus in cases of rebellion or invasion.81 
The Supreme Court has interpreted this as a greater-or-nothing rule 
in the sense that Congress retains the power to suspend habeas corpus 
altogether for reasons of public emergency, but does not have more 
limited power to reduce the procedural protections of habeas corpus 
incrementally while retaining the writ.82 The premise of this legal 
system seems to be that judicial review of regulations that alter 
(without suspending) habeas corpus is necessary because Congress 
and the executive branch cannot be trusted alone to balance interests 
of national security against due process values. At the same time, 
allowing Congress to suspend the writ assumes that there are some 
emergency cases that would justify a deviation from regular due 
process and that courts cannot be trusted to exercise habeas corpus 
power during such times. The judiciary may not appreciate national 
security concerns enough.  
 
80. See Jennifer Niles Coffin, Note, The United Mall of America: Free 
Speech, State Constitutions, and the Growing Fortress of Private 
Property, 33 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 615, 617–21 (2000) (describing 
the developing trend toward private shopping malls that do not allow 
free speech at the expense of traditional public forums).  
81. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
82. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787–92 (2008) (holding that the 
procedures provided by statute for trying Guantanamo Bay detainees 
were constitutionally inadequate as a substitute for habeas corpus).  
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It is possible to graph the potential effects of a greater-or-nothing 
rule under this set of assumptions. Figure 1 imagines the optimal level 
of process for military detainees as a cost-benefit spectrum, ranging 
from full due process rights in peacetime to the absence of all process 
in times of extreme emergency. Between these extremes, diminished 
procedures are optimal at various degrees, as depicted by the 
downward sloping curve in the center of the graph. Figure 1 also 
shows the spectrum as Congress and the judiciary might erroneously 
perceive it; that is, with Congress undervaluing due process and thus 
willing to diminish procedures too readily in times of risk, and with 
the judiciary failing to appreciate security interests and thus willing 
to impose procedures too late. Leaving the full decision to either 
Congress or the judiciary would cause a deviation from the optimal 
along either of these curves.  
 
Figure 1: Graph depicting the effect of greater-or-nothing rules on the 
suspension of habeas corpus. 
 
Finally, Figure 1 depicts in bold how an all-or-nothing rule might 
affect outcomes relative to what is optimal and to what Congress or 
the judiciary alone would choose. If Congress has no power to 
diminish habeas corpus but retains the power to suspend it altogether, 
we can predict that it would allow habeas corpus where there is only 
modest risk (at a level that the judiciary would control, possibly 
above the optimum). But at such point that Congress perceives 
enough of an emergency, it would suspend habeas corpus altogether, 
driving results below the optimum and possibly below even what 
Congress would choose if it were allowed partial options (because 
middle options are unavailable). Even though this rule is not perfect, 
it could be rational if it is better than the alternatives. If neither 
Congress nor the courts can fully be trusted, then there is no rule that 
can reach the optimal result in all cases. A rule giving full control to 
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the judiciary does best when closer to the peacetime end of the 
spectrum, and a rule giving full control to Congress does better at the 
emergency end of the spectrum. But only a greater-or-nothing rule 
preserves these optimal results at both ends of the spectrum. It does 
so, however, by distorting results (in both directions) at the middle of 
the spectrum.  
In summary, whether a greater-or-nothing rule is best for 
separating exceptional cases from a general set of constitutional rules 
along a spectrum depends on some key assumptions. First, it depends 
on assuming that neither the judiciary nor other branches of 
government are capable of balancing the costs and benefits on their 
own. Second, it depends on whether most scenarios are likely to be 
near the extremes on the spectrum of potential conditions and 
choices, where outcomes are improved by a greater-or-nothing rule 
relative to the alternatives. 
E. Baseline Decisions 
Greater-or-nothing rules might also work where the government 
has made background decisions that the judiciary uses to infer 
optimal results. This creates a potential for distorting the incentives 
of government actors, but if there is no other effective way to enforce 
a particular constitutional standard, it might be the best available 
option. Such rules work better if the government decisions to which 
the Constitution is tied are relatively inelastic, such that the 
attachment of constitutional consequences to such decisions is likely 
to cause little change. 
One could justify the public forum doctrine in this way. Perhaps 
what the First Amendment ideally would require is for the 
government to provide the optimal quantity of locations for public 
speech, but this principle would be impossible for the judiciary to 
enforce as a boundary rule without taking over the details of local 
land-use planning. As a next best option, the judiciary might choose 
to infer that where the government has deemed an area optimal for 
public pedestrian traffic, the area is also optimal for public speech. 
Courts might further assume that where a city has not made a place 
available as a public sidewalk or park, it would be too costly to make 
it available for speech. Although this assumption will not always be 
accurate, it could be more accurate than the judicially available 
alternatives. Another doctrine that could fit this rationale is the rule 
that habeas corpus applies only to noncitizen detainees in areas under 
U.S. sovereign control.83 This doctrine relies on the government’s 
baseline decisions as to the placement of alien detainees (whether to 
 
83. See id. at 764–66 (discussing the federal government’s position that the 
Constitution had no effect in Guantanamo Bay with regard to 
noncitizens because the United States had disclaimed sovereignty there).  
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move them to U.S. sovereign areas after capturing them) as an 
indication of whether habeas corpus would do more harm than good.  
The skewing effect of these kinds of rules are less significant if the 
baseline government decisions are costly to change relative to the bias 
that the doctrine serves to correct. A public forum doctrine that 
would require the government to tear up public sidewalks and 
physically devote the space to something else is preferable to one that 
would allow the government to get around the rule by merely 
changing the form of its ownership.84 The more elastic the 
government’s baseline decisions are, and the more biased the 
government is likely to be on the constitutional question under 
review, the more likely this kind of rule would backfire and cause 
more harm than good.  
F. Comparative Decisions 
Greater-or-nothing rules can also improve government decision 
making by tying biased government decisions to comparable decisions 
lacking in bias. This principle often works for rules that disfavor 
discrimination or underinclusiveness. By forcing the government to 
choose to act on all or none of a particular classification in the same 
manner, courts allow those branches of government with primary 
expertise to assess the costs and benefits that are beyond judicial 
competence while correcting for some known flaw in the government’s 
cost-benefit function. In this way, a better outcome would result than 
if either the court or the elected branch of government were acting 
alone.  
Consider how the Supreme Court has interpreted the First 
Amendment to strongly disfavor content-based speech regulations.85 
One need not believe that there is something inherently wrong with 
government favoritism for some kinds of speech to support the 
greater-or-nothing approach that the Supreme Court has infused into 
First Amendment law.86 A cost-benefit approach to the freedom of 
speech supports the judiciary’s use of an antidiscrimination approach 
to First Amendment analysis as well. Under a cost-benefit approach, 
a court’s job in reviewing a speech regulation is essentially to 
determine whether a regulation that inhibits some person’s speech is 
socially important enough to outweigh the loss of freedom that it 
 
84. See Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C., v. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las 
Vegas, 257 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that transferring title 
to public sidewalks, while retaining a public easement, does not avoid 
the public forum doctrine). 
85. See supra notes 35–45 and accompanying text. 
86. There are many environments in which the government is allowed to 
discriminate on the basis of content or even viewpoint. See Fee, supra 
note 35, at 1136–48 (describing areas of permissible content 
discrimination). 
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causes. But given the many kinds of regulations that can burden 
speech and the many variables that regulators understand better than 
courts on such matters, it is often dangerous for courts to second-
guess directly whether particular regulations are important enough to 
outweigh their costs. Fortunately, courts can predict that government 
regulators are more likely to be biased against speech interests when 
they know precisely what speech they are regulating. Conversely, 
courts can reasonably infer from the breadth of a regulation that the 
government’s interests are more likely credible and substantial; 
otherwise, the government would not be willing to inhibit speech that 
it favors along with all other speech. In this sense, rules favoring 
content neutrality are an aid to judicial review indirectly indicating 
(from the consistency of the regulator’s own decisions) what interests 
are important. Such rules also have a positive effect on the incentives 
of regulators. Encouraging the government to regulate speech broadly 
or not at all tends to correct its inherent biases, causing it to more 
accurately strike the optimal balance between speech interests and 
regulatory interests.  
Understanding the greater-or-nothing feature of free speech law as 
a tool of judicial review aimed toward improving government 
decisions also helps to explain why there are exceptions to the rules 
favoring content neutrality. There are times where courts allow 
content-based regulations and times that they disallow content-
neutral ones, indicating that neutrality is not the goal of First 
Amendment law for its own sake and that sometimes courts are 
confident enough to declare some categories of regulation 
unconstitutional or constitutional without relying on indicators of 
content neutrality.87 First Amendment law is a patchwork of 
boundary rules and greater-or-nothing rules, not because the law is 
lacking in principles, but because boundaries and greater-or-nothing 
rules have different kinds of advantages.  
We can see the same greater-or-nothing principle behind other 
antidiscrimination rules of constitutional law, including those relating 
to the Equal Protection Clause, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and 
the Free Exercise Clause. In each of these areas, a rule that requires 
equivalent treatment of people, ideas, or institutions—in defined 
situations—can make sense as a way of dividing responsibility 
between courts and elected government institutions, using the 
government’s decisions in less biased situations to infer the proper 
results in more biased situations. Whether or not one accepts equality 
as a fundamental value in our constitutional system, it is a highly 
 
87. See id. at 1107–13 (describing speech maximization and 
antidiscrimination as two competing values that are inherent in cases 
involving freedom of speech). 
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useful tool of judicial review for assessing whether other branches of 
government are doing their job well enough.  
G. Comparative Terms 
A parallel principle of judiciary review can illuminate rules that 
prohibit government deals with unconstitutional conditions. As 
described earlier, rules against unconstitutional conditions are greater-
or-nothing rules because they presume to allow the government a 
choice to grant or deny some opportunity categorically but prohibit it 
from offering the opportunity under only specified conditions (such as 
that affected individual pays the government officer a bribe). 
Constitutional rules that prohibit some kinds of conditions make sense 
if they are ways of gauging, from the judiciary’s perspective of limited 
information, whether the government has a sufficient interest to 
support even the limited restriction or denial of benefit that it 
threatens to impose. In many fields of government activity, courts 
cannot tell directly when the government should offer or deny an 
opportunity to some regulated individual; but this judicial 
disadvantage does not prevent courts from seeing that certain 
conditions are likely to distort the government regulator’s decisions in 
ways that undermine the usual principles of deference. Accordingly, 
when courts require the government to disperse certain benefits or 
regulatory exemptions in an all-or-nothing fashion, without suspect 
conditions attached, it improves that process of government decision 
making. 
The Supreme Court’s approach to the Takings Clause in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission88 and Dolan v. City of Tigard89 is an 
example of this principle at work. In Nollan and Dolan, the Supreme 
Court held that the government may not use conditions on land-use 
permits to coerce property owners to cede property rights to the 
government except in narrow situations. Land-use exactions of private 
property are valid only when the requested property interest would 
(a) redress specific impacts that the land development would 
otherwise cause (such as the property would serve infrastructure 
needs of the new proposed community) and (b) be proportional to 
those impacts.90 This rule works under the assumption that courts 
 
88. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
89. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
90.  Nolan, 483 U.S. at 836–37 (“[U]nless the permit condition serves the 
same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building 
restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan 
of extortion’”); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (“If petitioner’s proposed 
development had somehow encroached on existing greenway space in the 
city, it would have been reasonable to require petitioner to provide some 
alternative greenway space for the public either on her property or 
elsewhere.”) (citing Nolan, 483 U.S. at 836). 
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should typically defer to the government’s assessment of costs and 
benefits when they regulate land use. But the rule also assumes that 
when a government equivocates in such a way that it introduces a 
potential benefit to itself that ideally should be irrelevant, then 
judicial deference is improper. Compared to what regulators were 
doing, the Nollan-Dolan rule cuts for and against property owners. It 
surely causes some regulators to favor property owners by allowing 
land use unconditionally, but also causes other governments to favor 
regulatory interests by denying land use proposals categorically 
(because the benefits of improper exactions are not available). Either 
way, if the rule’s assumptions are accurate, the rule should make the 
government’s decisions more reliable. 
H. Disclosure Rules 
Yet another type of greater-or-nothing constitutional rule requires 
the government to add public procedures, disclosures, or statements 
to reach an ultimate decision that it admittedly has the power to 
reach. While such rules sometimes seem toothless and wasteful, they 
make sense where one assumes that government decision-making is 
improved by informed public oversight. When the judiciary imposes 
such rules, it need not understand the particular costs and benefits of 
government decisions, but rather it only needs to predict that 
government actors are likely to have some biases that informed voters 
do not share to the same degree. Disclosure rules therefore can nudge 
government decisions toward what would please informed voters.  
The government-speech doctrine of the First Amendment seems 
to work in this manner, as do rules affecting public education and 
limited public forums. In some environments, the government can 
favor speech on the basis of content and even viewpoint, contrary to 
the usual rules, if it is willing to declare in clear terms that the very 
purpose of the program involves the kind of speech preference in 
question.91 This supposes that government speech discrimination is 
sometimes worth its cost, but it also supposes that government actors 
are likely to do too much of it if allowed to discriminate under the 
public radar. What otherwise seems like a doctrinal loophole makes 
sense if one considers political influence to sometimes be valuable in 
achieving a well-functioning marketplace of ideas. A similar principle 
can arguably justify many other judge-made rules that enforce 
constitutional values, including federalism, freedom of religion, and 
criminal procedure.  
 
91. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472–81 
(2009) (holding that government acceptance of privately donated 
monuments for a public park was government speech and did not 
require acceptance on a content-neutral basis). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 1·2013 
Greater-or-Nothing Constitutional Rules 
128 
IV. Greater-or-Nothing Rules in a Complex Society 
The justifications for greater-or-nothing rules discussed in the last 
section share a common assumption: that there are some 
constitutional principles that courts are ill equipped to enforce as 
direct boundaries on government actors in other branches. Because we 
know that the judiciary has its own weaknesses, often the best rule is 
one that simply defers to other branches. But where government 
actors are known to be biased in predictable ways, deference can also 
lead to poor results. Greater-or-nothing rules provide a third 
alternative. Typically they require suspect government actions to be 
tied to other government actions in ways that are calculated to 
improve the decision maker’s incentives. The judiciary often makes 
these rules where its own institutional advantages enable it to identify 
weaknesses in government decision making that can be corrected in 
small ways. Greater-or-nothing rules are a way to use the advantages 
of courts and other branches of government to achieve results better 
than either could achieve alone.  
If comparative differences of courts and other branches of 
government explain why many greater-or-nothing rules exist, such 
differences also provide a powerful explanation for why courts have 
been increasingly turning to rules of this type. Greater-or-nothing 
rules tend to work best in environments in which the courts are least 
able to appreciate all of the effects of their decisions. This will more 
likely be true as society becomes more complex and diverse.  
A century ago the economy was relatively simple. Most 
Americans were farmers, business relationships were simple, and we 
had few complex regulatory structures. Perhaps this is why the 
judiciary of that era imposed its own economic vision on the political 
branches in a more direct manner in the form of constitutional 
boundaries rules, including substantive due process limits, the 
Commerce Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, ways that the 
Court avoids today.  
The same could be said of changes in culture, ethical values, and 
religion. A century ago, Americans were far more homogenous, such 
that it probably seemed natural for the Supreme Court to enforce 
ideals such as the freedom of speech and freedom of religion through 
boundaries based on common social assumptions of what is religion 
and what is valuable speech. As society has become more diverse and 
lacking on consensus, this undoubtedly has become a more difficult 
job for judges to perform. Increasingly, they have responded by 
abandoning the old boundary principles in favor of newer structural 
constitutional principles that manage the process of democracy rather 
than its results.  
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Seen in this way, greater-or-nothing rules are what Richard 
Epstein might call simple rules for a complex society92 or what 
Michael Polanyi might call decentralized rules for a spontaneous 
system of order.93 Both authors describe how the more complicated a 
system becomes, the more necessary it is to govern outcomes through 
simple, decentralized rules that referee independently motivated 
actors rather than through result-oriented, top-down governance of a 
hierarchical chain of command.94 They are rules for divided authority, 
which can have enormous advantages in terms of efficiency and 
accuracy over centralized systems of authority.95 While Epstein, 
Polanyi, and Zywicki are primarily concerned with how the 
government should regulate private actors in an increasingly complex 
market economy,96 the same insight can explain the relationship 
between the judiciary and other branches of government. Greater-or-
nothing constitutional rules enable a decentralized system of 
government, analogous to a decentralized economy. And like a market 
economy, a decentralized government with proper structural 
incentives can more effectively improve the public welfare on a wider 
range of policy areas than any single hierarchical system could 
accomplish.  
Thus, as society becomes more complex and diverse, it is natural 
for the judiciary to apply greater-or-nothing rules more often. At the 
same time, we should not become so comfortable with such rules as to 
lose sight of the assumptions that make them work. Nor must we 
assume that they are categorical imperatives such that we should 
ignore their consequences. There remain situations where greater-or-
 
92. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 53–149 (proposing simple rules in the areas of 
autonomy and property; contract; torts; necessity, coordination, and 
just compensation; and take and pay). 
93. Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and 
Rejoinders 159 (1951) (“When order is achieved among human beings 
by allowing them to interact with each other on their own initiative—
subject only to laws which uniformly apply to all of them—we have a 
system of spontaneous order in society.”).  
94. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 21 (“The proper response to more complex 
societies should be an ever greater reliance on simple legal rules, including 
older rules too often and too easily dismissed as curious relics of some 
bygone horse-and-buggy age.”); Zywicki, supra note 7, at 144–46 
(summarizing and supplementing Polanyi’s argument that a decentralized 
model of spontaneous order is essential for complex systems) 
95. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 30–36 (discussing the ability of simple 
rules to balance administrative cost and the risk of erroneous 
incentives); Zywicki, supra note 7, at 147 (discussing the benefits offered 
by simple rules of general applicability, including longevity, 
predictability, and allowance for individual discretion) 
96. See generally Zywicki, supra note 7, at 147 (discussing the impact of legal 
rules on individual actors within a larger system, such as the economy).  
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nothing rules could be inferior to either complete judicial deference or 
judicial scrutiny of final outcomes. It is further possible that some 
existing rules could be tweaked and improved while retaining their 
structure. Understanding the phenomenon, structure, and types of 
greater-or-nothing rules should make it easier to analyze them and 
ensure that they work as they should. 
